This paper explores one reason why a corporate board often fails to replace a substandard CEO. I consider the situation in which the incumbent CEO and directors make decisions in the absence of the new CEO. I show that in this situation, which is common in practice, the board and the CEO end up maximizing the expected utilities of the negotiating parties that do not include the expected utility of the potential CEO. This sometimes results in the retention of an ine¢ cient CEO. Moreover, I argue that this same logic provides a theoretical explanation for how a new CEO is chosen in relation to both the voluntary and enforced replacement of an existing CEO. Speci…cally, the equilibrium succession policy may depart from the optimum succession policy; that is, the optimum from the shareholders'perspective.
Introduction
A …rm's board of directors is responsible for monitoring management on the behalf of shareholders. A CEO is assigned to perform the role of …rm manager in a way that maximizes corporate pro…t for shareholders. However, the performance of the CEO does not always meet shareholders'expectations. In such a case, the role of the board is to replace the incumbent CEO with a new CEO who is more talented or better matched to the requirements of the …rm and its shareholders. Despite this, corporate boards often …nd it di¢ cult to replace an incumbent CEO. This paper attempts to provide a theoretical rationale for actions by the board of directors that depart from shareholders'interests through the bargaining process between the incumbent board and the incumbent CEO. In the model, the incumbent board's initial objective aligns with that of shareholders, where the term 'initial'indicates the objective before bargaining. 1 The starting point for this research is to investigate whether there is an advantage to be gained for the incumbent board members by retaining an incumbent substandard CEO, even though the expected corporate pro…t generated by appointing a new candidate is likely to be greater.
To attain this goal, I exploit a Nash bargaining game between two risk-neutral players;
namely, the incumbent CEO and the board of directors. There is no information asymmetry between the players. The board of directors is treated as a single player, and hence, there is no free-rider problem. 2 The incumbent CEO is perceived to have acquired …rm-speci…c knowledge, which places him in a more advantageous position than potential CEOs in two respects 3 : it grants him bargaining power to negotiate his own wage and a rent. 4 In this environment, the board of directors and the CEO bargain over three issues: the wage of the incumbent CEO, the succession policy, and the amount of money that the board is willing to pay to a specialist (or specialists) who monitors the incumbent CEO's conduct. I also assume that the larger the amount paid to the specialist, the more intense the monitoring; hence, I interpret this as meaning that the board and the incumbent CEO are determining the monitoring level. The term 'monitoring'in the analysis is used to refer to learning about the CEO's talent by reviewing his conduct, which is initially equally unknown to the board and the CEO. Based on the outcome of monitoring, the incumbent CEO may then be replaced with a potential CEO.
I show that when the two incumbent players bargain over these matters, the decision making is done in a way that maximizes only the joint expected payo¤ to the incumbent board and CEO, which does not internalize the utility of the potential newcomer to the current management group. Unlike issues that do not involve changes in the members of the management group, including decisions about the amount or choice of investment, the issuance of bonds or stock options, or policies oriented toward social reform, the decision to replace an incumbent CEO involves a change in the members of the management group.
However, the concern of the incumbent decision makers is to maximize only 'their' own bargaining surplus. Thus, despite the fact there are three players who may be potentially a¤ected by Nash bargaining, the two incumbent players who undertake the bargaining do not internalize the expected utility of the potential newcomer. As a result, the outcome of the process does not necessarily meet shareholders'expectations.
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Note that the potential newcomer to the management group di¤ers according to succession policy. That is, if the new CEO is recruited externally, the potential newcomer is the new CEO; alternatively, if the new CEO is internally promoted from the existing board members, then the newcomer is the new board member invited onto the board to …ll the resulting vacancy. Note that in the internal promotion case, however, if the board does not …ll the vacancy, there is no newcomer. 6 In what follows, I refer to the expected utility of the potential newcomer that should be internalized in the bargaining process as a leakage from the expected joint utility of the incumbent board and CEO. The analysis then shows that the incentive to minimize the leakage from the future surplus of the decision makers can account for ine¢ cient CEO replacement.
5 See Coase (1960) . 6 The board has two choices with internal promotion. The …rst is to keep the size of the board stable by appointing a new director after one of their number has been promoted to the position of CEO. The second is to reduce the size of the board by not hiring anyone after one of the directors has been promoted to the position of CEO. Logically speaking, the latter could happen. However, in practice, if the board continues not hiring a new director following an internal CEO replacement, the size of the board keeps contracting until there are no directors on the board. As this is unrealistic, I mainly consider the case in which the board …lls the vacancy following internal promotion.
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I identify a new cause for ine¢ cient CEO retention. That is, because of the noninternalization of the potential newcomer's utility, the equilibrium monitoring level of the …rm departs from the optimum monitoring level. This often results in CEO retention when CEO replacement is in fact optimal. More speci…cally, the monitoring level is determined at a level that reduces the probability of leakage. 7 Second, I identify that the noninternalization of the potential newcomer's utility a¤ects the choice regarding the appointment of a new CEO. As well as hiring a new CEO after the forced removal of an existing CEO, the board, along with the incumbent CEO, is responsible for choosing and appointing a new CEO when the incumbent CEO retires voluntarily. 8 That is, the shareholders expect them to hire a new CEO either externally or internally based on the talent of the candidate. Very few studies have attempted to develop a theoretical model of how a new CEO is chosen. 9 In this paper, I show that the succession policy is chosen not only by comparing the expected pro…ts brought to the …rm by the potential new CEO but also by comparing the amount of leakage. As leakage arises from the noninternalization of the potential newcomer's utility, the equilibrium succession policy may also depart from the optimum succession policy, the latter of which is the optimum from the shareholders'
perspective.
The analysis in this paper provides the following empirical implications. To start with, Parrino (1997) …nds that CEO replacement and outside succession are more frequently observed in homogeneous industries than in heterogeneous industries as it is easier for the board in homogeneous industries to identify a candidate with similar human capital required for the CEO's position. The theory developed in this paper is consistent with this …nding. As …rms in heterogeneous industries will have to recruit a CEO who has the appropriate human capital and experience, these …rms incur signi…cant search costs if they recruit externally. In addition, the new CEO's starting wage will be high. Thus, …rms in heterogeneous industries tend to retain the incumbent CEO or replace him with insiders to keep the leakage small.
Similarly, Berry et al. (2006) show that diversi…ed …rms require high-ability CEOs and that it is costly to …nd these CEOs in the managerial labor market. They also suggest that CEOs in diversi…ed …rms are more likely to be in this position through internal promotion than 7 The concept of leakage is more comprehensively illustrated in Appendix A6, using a simple model based on a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er game. 8 The board alone chooses the new CEO in the case of the forced retirement of the incumbent CEO. However, in the case of voluntary CEO replacement, the board and the incumbent CEO select the new CEO together. The succession policy considered in this paper can be applied to either case, as discussed in Subsection 3.1 and Appendix A4. 9 The existing work by Raheja (2005) is discussed in Section 2. 4 external recruitment. This paper provides another interpretation. If the talent of the insider and the outsider are not very di¤erent, the di¤erence in additional pro…t brought to the …rm is not so great whether an internal CEO or an external CEO is appointed. Even in this case, boards of diversi…ed …rms may prefer to recruit CEOs internally because internal promotion may not cause any leakage, while external recruiting always incurs leakage. Finally, there are many existing studies on CEO succession policy, for which the results are mixed. Some studies report that internal promotion is common, whereas others …nd external recruitment is more probable under certain conditions. 10 The theory developed in this paper may then usefully explain why boards sometimes appoint an external candidate and other times promote an internal candidate. This may bridge the divergence in the existing empirical …ndings.
The insights provided in this paper also delve yet further into the relation between board composition and …rm performance. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) …nd no relation between …rm performance and board composition, whereas Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Byrd and Hickman (1992) identify a positive correlation between …rm performance and board composition. In this analysis, as long as all of the directors on the board participate in the decision making, they share a common incentive: to minimize leakage from the incumbent group's utility. In other words, whether the directors are insiders or outsiders makes little di¤erence in terms of the incentive to pursue their own utility maximization, which does not internalize the potential newcomer's utility.
In practice, the board may include di¤erent types of directors with dissimilar utilities. For instance, boards typically comprise a mix of independent directors, lawyers, friends/acquaintances of the CEO, relatives of the CEO, and academics, among others. In this paper, I assume that all directors have the same utility because the primary goal of this paper is to show that decisions made in the boardroom in the absence of a potential CEO can favor the incumbent CEO, even if none of the directors is associated with the incumbent CEO. To focus on this point, I consider that all directors have the same objective function unin ‡uenced by the CEO's friendship or fear of being ousted by him. Thus, the important message from the …ndings of this paper is that even if the board is constituted solely by independent directors, the leakage e¤ect cannot be eliminated when decision making is done in the absence of a potential newcomer.
Indeed, most studies that examine the e¤ect of independent or management-friendly boards on CEO compensation and replacement policy treat the board as a single entity.
10 See Clutterbuck (1998) , Ocasio (1999) , and Agrawal et al. (2006) .
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Alternatively, at most, they assume that the board has a single utility function in which the degree of board independence a¤ects the costs incurred by the board in monitoring. See, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , Almazan and Suarez (2003) , Hermalin (2005) , Adams and Ferreira (2007) , and Harris and Raviv (2010) . This allows a clear-cut result and avoids unnecessary complexity. By contrast, some other studies are interested in considering the information transmission between insiders and outsiders or the allocation of corporate control and decision making between insiders and outsiders. See, for example, Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) . These then examine the e¤ect of information transmission and control allocation between insiders and outsiders on the value of the …rm. Hence, these studies assume the heterogeneity of board members. As this paper is mainly concerned with CEO replacement policy, I follow the former procedure and view the board as a unique and homogeneous entity.
However, I should acknowledge that the paper focuses on only two of the many tasks undertaken by boards of directors; namely, the monitoring or replacement of the CEO. In reality, the role of the board is not limited to CEO monitoring and replacement. However, the insights in this paper remain useful for examining the process and outcomes of negotiations held between incumbent executives, and the relation between board composition and CEO replacement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 constructs the theoretical model and discusses how the noninternalization of the potential newcomer to the board a¤ects CEO tenure and decisions on CEO succession policy. Section 4 discusses an extension to the model developed earlier. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
There are several works in the literature that theoretically discuss the cause of board inertia regarding CEO replacement. However, no studies have argued that utility loss for the group-that is, the noninternalization of the potential newcomer's utility-is a possible cause of CEO retention.
This paper is closely related to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , the incumbent board, which is considered as a single player that has collective preferences, and the CEO determine the wage of the incumbent CEO and a new director to be appointed to the board through Nash bargaining. This new board with the new director can be regarded as a di¤erent board from the incumbent board. After the Nash bargaining, 6 this new board monitors the incumbent CEO. 11 Thus, the incumbent CEO is willing to compromise his wage in exchange for appointing a new director likely to be loyal to him. Their main …nding is that when the CEO is involved in appointing a new director, someone less independent from the CEO is appointed, and this weakens the board monitoring of the CEO, resulting in CEO retention. 12 Their study measures the cost of monitoring with notation k: the board's lack of independence, where it changes from k 0 (exogenously given) to k 1 (endogenously determined) (k 0 < k 1 ) as the board members change. This k can be interpreted as a collective measure of comradeship or allegiance to the existing CEO, and they argue that the higher k is , or the stronger the comradeship or allegiance to the CEO, the less the board monitors the incumbent CEO. In short, the monitoring level and the measure of the board's lack of independence have a one-to-one correspondence, and we can consider that the incumbent board and the incumbent CEO are the players determining the monitoring level. Thus, the incumbent CEO remains in a …rm for longer than he deserves according to his talent.
In sum, the reason for board reluctance to remove a substandard CEO in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) is that the CEO selects the board members, and hence it is costly for the board whose members are less independent of the CEO to dismiss the incumbent CEO. Conversely, in this paper, I extend their model to focus on negotiations held by the current management group-speci…cally, the incumbent board and the incumbent CEOwhich would mostly take place in an insular boardroom. Both studies, of course, concern the board's inability to replace a substandard CEO, even when the board's objective function aligns with the interests of shareholders. However, the di¤erence between this paper and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) is that this paper focuses on the incentive of the current board members to retain the incumbent CEO in the absence of his in ‡uence on the board 11 In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , monitoring levels are de…ned through board composition, which is determined by the board and the incumbent CEO. Speci…cally, the incumbent board and CEO Nash bargain over some new board member, whose monitoring cost is determined by how independent the new director is from the incumbent CEO. In this paper, I interpret monitoring levels as the probability that the board and the CEO obtain information about the CEO's talent from the specialist whom they hire. All directors receive this information equally, and hence it is assumed that there is no information asymmetry among directors. Thus, when the incumbent board and CEO determine the amount that they pay the specialist, it can be considered that they are determining the monitoring level.
12 Similar to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , the CEO in this paper does not make an e¤ort, and the monitoring is done to replace a poorly matched CEO with a new CEO, as the pro…t of the …rm is dependent on the talent of the CEO. Adachi-Sato (2013) incorporates the e¤ort of the incumbent CEO and studies how stock-based compensation can mitigate the moral hazard problem but can still a¤ect the tenure of the incumbent CEO. See also Inderst and Mueller (2010) and Laux (2012) for the analysis of CEO tenure and incentives. members'utility. In other words, incumbent directors are not selected by the incumbent CEO or will not be …red by him, but they still have an incentive to undertake actions that would favor him. I then explain the current board's action with its incentive to avoid utility loss for the current management group. I show that the board, even though its members have no relationship with the incumbent CEO, could still be an ine¢ cient monitoring device. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , on the other hand, consider the CEO's in ‡uence on the board's actions. That is, the incumbent CEO transforms the existing board members into new board members, and this new board …nds it di¢ cult to replace the incumbent CEO because they have been handpicked by the CEO. 13 One very intuitive example that can be explained by the board behavior discussed in their model is the board of Disney when
Michael Eisner was CEO. 14 Another notable di¤erence is that this study incorporates the process in which the board determines where to hire the next CEO, an issue assumed to be exogenous in the model proposed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998 At …rst sight, the work by Raheja (2005) may appear similar to the present analysis, for it considers both the level of monitoring and CEO succession policy. In Raheja's (2005) paper, succession policy is the implementation mechanism that motivates insiders to reveal their 13 In their model, CEO replacement can induce leakage. However, they do not discuss the e¤ect on board decision making. Hence, I would like to extend their model by showing how the noninternalization of the potential CEO's welfare a¤ects the decisions determined by the board.
14 At the time, Disney claimed that 13 of its 16 board members were independent directors. However, it is well known that these so-called independent directors included the headmaster of the school and the president of the university that Eisner's child(ren) attended, Eisner's private attorney, and a paid consultant to Disney. superior information; that is, when outside directors could verify the bad project, the next CEO is voted in from one of the inside directors who had revealed the information. However, as the focus of her study is more on the mechanism for sharing information among directors, the CEO succession policy itself is not completely determined endogenously. Speci…cally, even though inside directors have a choice to reveal information or not, when it comes to appointing a successor, whether the CEO is hired externally or internally is given as a rule.
In contrast, in my model, all directors are considered to have equal information, but the CEO's successor is determined endogenously in a game through maximizing the utilities of all incumbent members.
Several other studies also explain the ine¢ cient replacement of the CEO by the board. For example, directors may fear ousting from the board when they do not succeed in replacing the CEO (Warther 1998) . Similarly, CEOs may take deliberate actions to create speci…c human capital that makes it costly to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny 1989) or there may be factors a¤ecting the information environment of the board (Adams and Ferreira 2007) . This study provides a di¤erent perspective from these existing studies in that it shows how the outcome of negotiation becomes distorted when the incumbent CEO and the board discuss issues relating to member change in their group in the absence of a potential newcomer.
Model

Basic Structure
In this section, I show that CEO replacement induces a change of member in the management group, and this results in a certain utility loss to the incumbent members'group utility. This deprives them of the incentive to remove or monitor the incumbent CEO to avoid leakage unless the expected pro…t brought by a new CEO is large enough to compensate the amount of leakage. I also show that the type of leakage varies according to the succession policythat is, a choice arises between recruiting an internal candidate or recruiting an external candidate-and that incumbents prefer the succession policy with the smaller amount of leakage, all other things held equal.
For simplicity, I assume that the board and the incumbent CEO determine the succession policy together with the CEO's wage and the amount of money paid to the specialist reviewing the CEO's conduct. This setting may sound reasonable only for voluntary CEO retirement. However, I assert that the succession policy and the monitoring level need not be determined simultaneously in this model. Purely for the sake of simplicity, I determine these three decisions together in the model developed below. 15 In other words, the board is not making a commitment to the succession policy determined prior to the CEO replacement.
Hence, the logic in this paper is equally applicable to succession policy relating to enforced and voluntary CEO replacement.
Players
There are two players: the incumbent board and the incumbent CEO. I use the term 'board' to refer to n directors acting as a single player. As all n directors act as a single player, the board, there is no free-rider problem. The passive player is the new CEO, who is either promoted internally or recruited externally.
Equilibrium Strategies
The model comprises a cooperative game and a noncooperative game. In the cooperative game, the board and the incumbent CEO Nash bargain over the choice of a new CEO, the wage of the incumbent CEO w, and the amount d(p) that they pay to the specialist for reviewing the CEO's conduct. 16 17 In the noncooperative game, the board and CEO update their prior distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent with probability p: This p is interpreted to be the probability of obtaining informative signal about the CEO's true talent, which is either T talented or S substandard. With probability (1 p), the board and CEO obtain uninformative information about the CEO's talent. In the game de…ned below, the equilibrium strategy for the board is to replace the incumbent CEO when it believes him to be likely to be S, otherwise to retain him.
Payo¤s
The incumbent CEO receives the endogenously determined wage w, and a noncontractible private bene…t b only when he is retained until the …nal stage. An example of b is reputation, which will give him bargaining power in the future. The new CEO receives the starting wage.
The new CEO's wage is w O if recruited externally, and w N if promoted internally from the incumbent board. The board's expected pro…t is assumed to be equal to the expected …rm pro…t that is dependent on the distribution of the CEO's talent, k , where k stands for the 15 In Appendix A4, an identical result is obtained using the same logic when the board alone redetermines the succession policy after …ring the incumbent CEO. 16 What is determined in Nash bargaining is the equilibrium outcome of the board and CEO. The succession policy, the monitoring level p and the wage w are all determined in the Nash bargaining game, predicting the following noncooperative game. 17 The specialist can be someone like an internal auditor, but the board may hire a more skilled specialist if it is willing to pay a high p.
signal regarding the CEO's talent.
18 Appendix A1 depicts in detail the process of deriving k through the Bayesian update of the CEO's talent k . I denote X as the random variable that represents the …rm pro…t generated by the CEO. X = X H when the …rm pro…t is high, and X = X L when the …rm pro…t is low. Then, when the CEO's talent is given, the expected pro…t of the …rm is denoted by E(Xji) under the incumbent CEO or the new CEO recruited internally, where i denotes the CEO's true talent;
T or S.
19 Hence, when the CEO's talent is unknown, the expected …rm pro…t is expressed
under the incumbent CEO or the new CEO recruited internally. k is classi…ed in the following four cases, k = I; G; B, or N : the incumbent CEO's talent is not updated (I ), the incumbent CEO's talent is updated as more likely to be talented (G), the incumbent CEO's talent is updated as more likely to be substandard (B), or the new CEO is internally recruited following the dismissal of the incumbent CEO (N ).
The de…nition of k is given as follows. I assume that both the board and the incumbent CEO hold the prior probability distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent being T with
. Any other potential CEOs'prior distribution of their talent is assumed to be precisely , and the …rm pro…t is expected to be N .
If a new CEO is recruited externally, the expected …rm pro…t dependent on the distribution of the externally hired CEO's talent is expressed
In short, j is the unconditional expected …rm pro…t. From now on, I refer to it simply as an expected …rm pro…t. 19 Note that
where P i j = PrfX j ja i g, and X j is the pro…t of the …rm for j 2 fH; Lg.
20 In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , the initial CEO's talent is updated before the negotiation in order to give the CEO some bargaining power. However, this process can be shortened by assuming the prior about his talent to be higher than that of any new potential CEO. the talent of any new CEO is assumed to be 1 2 . Z j ; j 2 fH; Lg is the …rm pro…t produced by the externally hired CEO, hence the expected …rm pro…t conditional on i is expressed as E(Zji). E(Zji) is de…ned similarly to E(Xji).
As a result, the relations among …rm expected pro…ts are induced by the Bayesian update of k , and they are G > I > O > B and G > I > N > B . The di¤erence between O and N comes from whether the new CEO is hired externally or internally from the incumbent board members. I do not specify the relation between O and N , as there are both advantages and disadvantages for both types of potential CEO. 
Timing
There are four stages. The basic structure of the interaction between the board and the incumbent CEO follows from Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) .
F irst stage:
The …rm has one incumbent CEO and the board of directors. All the incumbent members Nash bargain over the contract regarding the wage of the incumbent CEO, denoted as w, the amount d(p) that they pay to the specialist who monitors the incumbent CEO, and the succession policy about whether to hire a new CEO externally or internally. Note that p is interpreted as the intensity of monitoring by the specialist, and this equals the probability that the board obtains informative signal about the incumbent CEO's talent. At this stage, the initial belief of the board and the incumbent CEO regarding the incumbent CEO's talent being T is T , whereas their initial belief about any other potential CEO's talent being T is 1 2 .
Second stage: The specialist monitors the CEO's conduct and provides information, y k , k = I; G; B to the board of directors. Based on this information, the board updates the subjective probability distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent. Hence, this information y k is identi…ed with the signal k 2 fI; G; Bg that is de…ned in Subsection 3.1. The incumbent CEO also equally learns the signal information. With probability p, the board receives information fy G ; y B g. With probability (1 p), the board receives uninformative information y I ; and the subjective probability distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent remains unchanged.
T hird stage: The board retains or replaces the incumbent CEO based on the information. 
The Players'Objectives
The number of directors n on the board, the private bene…t b that the CEO receives at the end of the game, and the wages to the newly hired CEO, w O if recruited externally, and w N if recruited internally, are exogenously given. 24 In addition, I de…ne q = Pr(y G je); and 1 q = Pr(y B je) where e denotes the event of the board receiving information, y G or y B .
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The incumbent CEO's expected utility is expressed as: 22 To be more precise, suppose the number of board members who will be …red with the incumbent CEO is …xed. For example, suppose it is …xed at 20%. Then, it would only increase leakage by 20%. This does not a¤ect the primary result of this paper. 23 Board members, of course, do change over time. However, a change in board membership triggered directly by CEO replacement should be considered to take place within a few months.
24 From the perspective of game theory, the wage w N that will be paid to the internally promoted CEO could be endogenously determined. If the model were built in this way, the incumbent directors would increase the amount of wage w N as much as possible. This is because n 1 n N + b + 1 n w N can be derived from the expression (3) presented later in this subsection. However, the shareholders will not allow such high wage to be determined by the inside directors, and hence it would be unrealistic.
25 q depends on T : Because T is exogenously given, q is also exogenous. Suppose T = 2 3 and S = 1 3 : Suppose that when monitored, the CEO shows good performance with probability 3 4 , when his true type is T and shows good performance with probability 1 4 if his true type is S. In this setting, the probability of observing good performance, that is y G , is 
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for he surely receives the wage w determined in the negotiation, but the private bene…t b is only given when he is retained to the end of the game. The CEO is retained when the board receives y G , which occurs with probability pq, or y I , which occurs with probability (1 p).
In other words, if the incumbent CEO is dismissed prior to the last stage, he will not obtain b.
The expected utility of the board, which is the total of the n incumbent directors, di¤ers by where they choose the new CEO from.
If the new CEO is to be recruited externally, it is expressed as:
The …rst and the second terms in (2) are the expected utilities of the board when it receives information about the incumbent CEO. With probability pq; the board receives y G , and each director on the board will receive G n : With probability p(1 q), the board receives y B , and hence the board replaces the incumbent CEO. Then, each director on the board will receive
. The wage w O is paid to the new CEO, who will be hired externally. The new CEO does not have any bargaining power, and hence the amount of this wage is assumed to be determined in the market. The new CEO, if hired with probability p(1 q), will also obtain the private bene…t b, but this is not internalized in either the board utility or the incumbent CEO's utility. 26 The third term in (2) is the utility of the board when the incumbent CEO is retained as a result of the board receiving signal y I . The fourth term d(p); where p 2 [0; 1), is the cost of monitoring, which is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, twice-continuously di¤erentiable function. I assume d 0 (0) = 0; and d 0 (p) ! 1 as p ! 1; which derive interior solutions. The …fth term, w, is the wage paid to the incumbent CEO.
Alternatively, the expected utility of the board is expressed as the following if the new CEO is recruited internally from the incumbent board members:
I assume that each internal director has an equal opportunity of being promoted to be the new CEO. This is re ‡ected in the second term of (3). 27 That is, when the board obtains y B with probability p(1 q), the incumbent CEO is …red. Then, one of the internal directors is 26 The main result in this paper will not be a¤ected if the amount of b is di¤erent for a CEO who was monitored and retained versus one who was retained without monitoring. 27 The second term in (3) can be re-written as p (1 q) n
promoted to be the new CEO, while the remaining directors stay on the board. That is, the new CEO will receive w N , while the remaining n 1 directors each receive In what follows, I discuss how monitoring levels and succession policies are determined when the incumbent board members are not internalizing the potential newcomer's utility.
Nash product is either:
28 I assume that the new CEO is unmonitored only to simplify the analysis. The main result would be the same even if he were monitored. That is, the purpose of this paper is to show how negotiations between the CEO and the board distort the CEO replacement if they are done in the absence of the potential new CEO.
29 Note that there are two possible cases for newcomers. When the board recruits the CEO externally, the newcomer is the new CEO. When the board promotes one of the incumbent directors to the board, the newcomer is then the new director who is hired to re…ll the board. In the long term, the board size may decrease, but in the short term, the board needs to retain a certain number of directors to maintain its operations. Moreover, re…lling the board has an aspect of providing incentives to workers to work hard in order to be internally promoted to be a director in the future. 30 The wage w is subtracted from the incumbent board's expected utility and added to the incumbent CEO's expected utility as w. See Appendix A2 for details.
or:
The di¤erence between (4) and (5) derives from where the new CEO will be hired: Nash product (4) is when the new CEO is going to be externally hired, while (5) is when the new CEO is going to be internally promoted. The threat points are expressed as ( B; C )
for (4) and (5). That is, if the negotiation breaks down, the board will receive B; and the incumbent CEO will receive c .
Under a given succession policy, the players determine the optimum monitoring level p that will attain the highest Nash bargaining frontier. Note that the Nash bargaining frontier is linear at 45 degrees. As shown in Appendix A2 and Figure 1 , the bargaining frontier can be expressed as the sum of the board's expected utility and the incumbent CEO's expected utility. Hence, when comparing the two succession policies, the board decides to adopt the succession policy with the highest bargaining frontier, where the highest attainable level is di¤erent between the two succession policies. 31 Thus, the succession policy that achieves a higher bargaining frontier will be chosen. 32 However, one policy does not always have a higher frontier than the other policy; for example, external recruiting is not always better than internal recruiting, and vice versa. Whether one policy is more desirable than the other depends on the di¤erence between the expected pro…ts brought to the …rm by the new CEO and the amount of leakage that occurs.
I …rst show how the optimal succession policy is determined given the monitoring level.
The joint expected utility of the incumbent members when the new CEO is externally hired is expressed as:
which is the addition of (1) and (2). The joint expected utility of the incumbent members when one of the internal directors is promoted to be the new CEO is expressed as:
which is the addition of (1) and (3).
In comparing the above two expressions, the su¢ cient condition to hire a CEO externally is expressed as:
and the su¢ cient condition to promote an internal director to CEO is expressed as:
The to the board to maintain the board size at n. Recall that the internally promoted new CEO is the original incumbent board member, so any expected payment that he will receive is not considered as a leakage from the whole group.
Given the above argument, the incumbents' decision to promote an internal director or to recruit externally is determined by comparing the amount of di¤erence between the leakages and the amount of di¤erence between the expected pro…ts brought to the …rm by the potential CEOs. This trade-o¤ leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1
The incumbent executive members'decision to appoint an internal or external CEO is based on how small they can keep their utility loss. In other words, incumbent executives do not simply compare the expected pro…ts that internal and external CEOs bring to the …rm; rather, they compare the expected pro…t less the leakage from the expected group utility of the incumbent executives. Thus, the incumbent executives decide to recruit externally when (8) holds, and they decide to promote one of the internal directors as a successor CEO when (9) holds. The theoretical implication of Proposition 1 is as follows. First, in this model, the starting wage of an externally hired new CEO is given exogenously as w O , but even if I were to interpret this as a total cost in appointing a new external CEO, it would not a¤ect the main result of the paper. Hence, I can interpret w O as the starting wage plus the search cost.
Second, while external promotion always causes leakage from the total expected utility of the incumbent executives, an internal promotion can cause no leakage if the board is not re…lled for a short time. In this case, if the talent of the new CEOs are expected to be about the same as to bring the same amount of expected …rm pro…t, N = O , the incumbent executives will choose to promote internally one of their directors to the post of CEO because doing so would incur no leakage. These arguments lead to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the …rm is willing to reduce the board size in the short run.
Then, the current executives are willing to appoint an internal candidate to the post of CEO when the internal CEO candidates and the external CEO candidates are expected to have similar talent, or if it incurs too much search cost to …nd talented external candidates.
The empirical implication of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 is as follows. Berry et al. (2006) argue that diversi…ed …rms require talented CEOs, and they provide empirical evidence that diversi…ed …rms are then less likely to replace their CEOs than focused …rms and that diversi…ed …rms are more likely to promote insiders internally to the post of CEO.
As diversi…ed …rms require talented CEOs, it could be said that in diversi…ed …rms, the board incurs signi…cant search costs to …nd a talented external potential CEO. With a small search cost, it could only …nd an external potential CEO of average talent. Then, because N O is likely to be small while w O is likely to be large, the board …nds it in its own interest to promote an internal candidate to the post of CEO rather than to appoint an average external potential CEO in diversi…ed …rms. Parrino (1997) gives empirical evidence that CEO replacement and outside CEO succession are more frequently observed in homogeneous industries than in heterogeneous industries, because …rms in heterogeneous industries incur signi…cant search costs if they recruit CEOs externally. Repeating the above argument, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are consistent with this empirical evidence.
Corollary 1 can also explain the recent CEO replacement at Groupon, Inc. in 2013. In Groupon, when the CEO was …red in February, none of the directors left with him. The board searched for a new CEO for …ve months, but in August, they announced that one of their internal board members, in fact the chairman, would be the successor CEO. The size of the board has contracted. The case of Groupon does not involve the incumbent CEO in the appointment process of a new CEO, but as proved in Appendix A4, the theory developed in this paper is applicable to such cases as well. Therefore, the Groupon case shows that the internal board members found the search for an external CEO too costly and too di¢ cult, so they promoted one of their incumbent board members to the position of CEO.
Next, I show how the monitoring levels are determined.
Proposition 2 For a given succession policy, the monitoring level is uniquely determined.
If the board determines to recruit externally, it is:
2. If the board determines to promote one of the internal incumbent directors, it is:
Proposition 2 suggests that because of the noninternalization of the potential newcomer's utility, the equilibrium monitoring levels are attenuated by the amount of leakage. This often results in CEO retention when CEO replacement is in fact optimal for the …rm. Monitoring levels are the proxies for CEO retention in this model. This implies that CEO retention is determined at a level that reduces the probability of leakage.
The monitoring levels are determined at the level that achieves the highest possible Nash bargaining frontier, given the succession policy. The leakage that the incumbent board incurs by replacing the CEO is re ‡ected in the last term of both (10) and (11). That is, with probability (1 q), the incumbent CEO is …red, a newcomer is hired, and leakage from the bargaining surplus occurs as
. If the board brings an external CEO into the …rm, the new CEO is the newcomer, and the wage w O and the bene…t b are the leakage.
When one of the internal directors is promoted to CEO, the board hires a new director to maintain the number of directors at n: Thus the payment of N w N n is given to this new director, and this is considered a leakage, at least from the perspective of the incumbent board members. In short, monitoring levels are attenuated for both (10) and (11) because the incumbent executives who determine the monitoring level wish to minimize the utility loss from their own group utility. 
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The implications of Proposition 2 is as follows. First, the larger the leakage, the lower the monitoring level, p. This reduces the probability of the board obtaining precise information about the CEO's talent. As the monitoring level is interpreted as the probability of obtaining precise information, the board obtains k = G or B with probability p, but with probability
(1 p), the board obtains k = I. The …rm's expected pro…t is determined by the CEO's updated talent and the signals of the CEO's talent k, and described as
and G > I > N > B . In short, less monitoring reduces the probability of the …rm having G . Next, internal promotion can provide an incentive to incumbent insiders to monitor the incumbent CEO. This is similar to Raheja (2005) in the sense that succession policy is used to remove a substandard CEO but I apply di¤erent logic. That is, in this paper, the higher the wage w N of the new internally promoted CEO, the stronger the board incentive to monitor the incumbent CEO (see (11)). In short, if the new CEO's wage is to some extent large, it causes virtuous competition among the inside directors.
Lastly, the expected utility of the board under the external-recruiting policy is expressed as (2). This can be considered as a board that is composed solely of outside directors.
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On the other hand, the expected utility of the board under the internal-promotion policy is expressed as (3), and this can be interpreted as the expected utility of a board composed solely of inside directors. 35 Therefore, regardless of board composition, the board may …nd it in its own interest to retain the incumbent CEO.
4 Extension: Internalization of the Newcomer' s Welfare
Social Surplus Maximization
Below I show that when the incumbent board members do internalize the newcomer's utility, the monitoring level is higher than the equilibrium monitoring levels determined by the 34 Note that when the board decides to recruit the new CEO from outside the board, none of the incumbent directors becomes a CEO candidate. One way to interpret this type of board is to consider it as a board composed solely of outside directors who have their primary job elsewhere, such as with an academic, and hence have less incentive to become the successor CEO of the …rm in which they are serving as an outside director. 35 When the board decides to recruit the new CEO from within, all of the incumbent directors become potential CEOs. Thus, the board with the internal-promotion policy can be considered to have the same expected utility as the board composed solely of inside directors. incumbent board and CEO, and the succession policy equals the optimum succession policy for shareholders.
The optimum succession policy is to hire a new CEO expected to bring a higher net expected pro…t:
This is the optimum for all three players: the incumbent CEO, the board, and the potential newcomers. For simplicity, I assume w O = w N . Then, (12) is expressed as:
This equals the optimum from the shareholders'perspective as well.
Because the players'utilities are transferable, and they all Nash bargain, the optimum monitoring level is determined so as to maximize the joint expected utility of all players, including the incumbent members and the newcomers. A newcomer is a new CEO under the external-recruiting policy and a new director under the internal-promotion policy, who may be appointed to the board after the CEO is replaced. The joint expected utility of such a case is expressed as:
See Appendix A3 for the proof. Taking the …rst-order condition with respect to p induces the optimum level of monitoring:
Equation (15) shows that when the incumbent board members internalize the expected utility of future newcomers to the board, the board monitoring level is not attenuated by leakage, which is either
Reemployment of the Retired CEO
Theoretically, the social surplus maximization described in Section 4.1 is attained if there is no newcomer to the incumbent management group. If there is no newcomer, the monitoring level becomes more intense, and the probability of removing an ine¢ cient CEO increases.
One way to achieve this is to reemploy the retired CEO in a director's position under an internal-promotion system. Under an internal-promotion system, if the incumbent CEO 21 departs, one of the directors becomes the CEO. Instead of hiring a new director to maintain the board size at n, if a retired CEO is hired/remains as a director, there is no leakage. The idea is to reemploy the CEO who was participating in the negotiation instead of hiring a new director or promoting a successful worker to the position of director. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The monitoring level with no newcomer to the corporate board is expressed as: 
Conclusion
This paper provides an explanation for ine¢ cient CEO retention and CEO appointments.
The succession policy, the incumbent CEO's wage, and the monitoring level are determined by all of the incumbent directors and the incumbent CEO. When they jointly determine these matters, they do not internalize the utility of the potential newcomer. Thus, the incumbents are maximizing their joint expected utility, but this process involves utility leakage from the whole group. I show that the equilibrium monitoring level departs from the optimum monitoring level of the …rm, too often resulting in retention of a substandard CEO. I also show that the equilibrium succession policy may depart from the optimum succession policy, the latter of which is the optimum from the shareholders'perspective.
In this model, the incumbent board and CEO do not negotiate with the potential CEOs, if only to simplify the exposition. This means that, irrespective of whether the model allows the board and CEO to have a choice of negotiating or not negotiating with the potential CEOs, they may choose not to involve a potential new CEO if they consider their expected payo¤ to be smaller under the no-leakage situation; that is, three-player bargaining. Hence, the result that the management group's decision departs from shareholders' expectation continues to hold.
Finally, as argued in Williamson (2008) , there are some observed disparities between boards in theory and in practice. For example, in order to focus on the board's incentive to retain the incumbent CEO in the absence of the incumbent CEO's in ‡uence, I consider that all board members have the same utilities. That is, I postulate that the utility of all directors aligns with that of shareholders, and they are therefore treated as a single player.
Doing this allows us to discern minutely the important aspect of the board that I discuss in this paper. However, readers must be aware that board composition or directors with di¤erent utilities must not be neglected given the other purposes of the board. The CEO's talent is exogenously given as a i ; i 2 fT; Sg;where a T de…nes that the CEO is talented, and a S de…nes that the CEO is substandard. No player knows the true talent of the CEO, and there is no information asymmetry among the players. The prior distribution of the talent of the incumbent CEO is given exogenously as i ; i 2 fT; Sg; where T > S , and T + S = 1. I assume that both the board and the incumbent CEO hold a subjective probability distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent that he is T with probability
On the other hand, the prior distribution of the talent of any new potential CEO, regardless of whether he is an internal or an external candidate, is assumed to be 1 2 for being a T or a S .
The pro…t of the …rm under the incumbent CEO or an internally promoted CEO is denoted as X j , j 2 fH; Lg, where X H > X L > 0.
Then the conditional probability of an outcome dependent on the talent of the incumbent or internal CEO is expressed as P i j
PrfX j ja i g. For example, P T L is the probability that the CEO produces X L conditional on a T . See Table A .
holds. Given these assumptions, the expected …rm pro…t conditional on the CEO's talent is expressed as E(XjT ) P
Thus, the unconditional expected …rm pro…t is expressed as:
when the CEO is appointed internally from the board. It is expressed as:
when the incumbent CEO serves to the end of the game without his talent being updated.
If the incumbent CEO is monitored, the prior distribution of his talent is updated through the Bayes rule. See Table B .
Table B with probability p with probability
y 2 fy G ; y B ; y I g is the signal the board obtains regarding the incumbent CEO's talent.
Informative information fy G; y B g is obtained with probability p and uninformative information fy I g is obtained with probability (1 p). The probability distribution on fy G; y B g conditional on the talent of the incumbent CEO is expressed as R i j = Prfy j ja i g. When the board obtains informative signal, it receives y G with probability q, and y B with probability (1 q). When the board receives y G , the subjective probability that the incumbent CEO has a talent a T , is updated from T to
) for the monitoring raises the expected outcome of the …rm if the incumbent CEO is believed to be likely to be a T . Likewise,
, and this is assumed to be
). When the board receives y I , the subjective probability about the CEO's talent being a T remains unchanged at . Given these assumptions, the unconditional 24 expected …rm pro…t is expressed as:
when the board receives y G . It is expressed as:
when the board receives y B .
Lastly, I denote as O the unconditional expected …rm pro…t which is expressed as:
The pro…t of the …rm under a new externally recruited CEO is denoted as Z j , j 2 fH; Lg,
The conditional probability of an outcome dependent on the talent of the new CEO is de…ned in a similar way as that of the incumbent and internally promoted CEO. Thus, E(ZjT ) is the expected …rm pro…t when the externally hired CEO's true talent is a T and E(ZjS) is the expected …rm pro…t when his true talent is a S .
As a result, the relations
induced by the Bayesian update, and I also assume I > O :
q.e.d.
Appendix A2: The Proof of Proposition 2
I …rst prove equation (10). If the board determines to recruit externally, the Nash product is represented by (4). I denote B and C as the threat points of each of the players, where ( B ; C ) is assumed to be an interior point of the feasible set. In this model, whatever the amount of the threat point that is in the interior of the feasible set, it does not a¤ect the decisions regarding the succession policy and the monitoring levels. I denote the …rst large bracket in (4) as A and the second as B. Then, the …rst-order condition maximizing V O with respect to p yields:
Next, I derive the …rst-order condition maximizing V O with respect to w: The …rst-order 25 condition with respect to w yields:
Thus, (A1) and (A2) yield @A @p + @B @p = 0: Hence, this is the maximization of the joint expected utility, w.r.t. p. Organize this, and d 0 (p) is obtained as:
which is the level of monitoring as shown in (10). Thus, the frontier is expressed as a 45-degree line, for w is transferable.
It follows from (A2) that the wage w is determined as:
Next, I prove (11). If the board determines to promote one of the internal incumbent directors, the Nash product is expressed by (5). I denote B and C as the threat points of each of the players, where ( B ; C ) is assumed to be an interior point of the feasible set. I denote the …rst bracket in (5) as A and the second as B. Then, the …rst-order condition maximizing V I with respect to p yields:
Next, I derive the …rst-order condition maximizing V I with respect to w. The …rst-order condition with respect to w yields:
Thus, from (A3) and (A4),
= 0 is obtained. Hence, this is the maximization of the joint expected utility, w.r.t.p. Then, organize this to obtain d 0 (p); which is expressed as:
which is the level of monitoring as shown in (11). Thus, the frontier is expressed as a 45-degree line, for w is transferable.
It follows from (A4) that the wage w is determined as:
Appendix A3. The Proof for Social Surplus Maximization in Section 4.1
The expected utility of the whole group under external recruiting policy
The expected utility for the board is:
The expected utility for the incumbent CEO is:
The expected utility for the potential CEO is:
Thus, from (A5), (A6), and (A7), the sum of all three players'utilities derived as a result of Nash bargaining, is expressed as:
and the equilibrium monitoring level is derived as:
The expected utility of the group under the internal promotion policy
where the potential new CEO's expected utility is internalized in the above expected utility as p(1 q)(b + w N ): This is because one of the incumbent directors becomes the new CEO if the incumbent CEO is dismissed. The expected utility of the incumbent CEO is the same as that of the external recruiting policy, and it is (A6).
The expected utility of the new director hired after the CEO replacement, who will be considered as a newcomer to the group under the internal-promotion policy, is expressed as:
From (A6), (A9), and (A10), the sum of all three players derived as a result of Nash bargaining is expressed as:
From (A8) and (A11), the optimum monitoring level for the group is expressed as:
which is the monitoring level shown in (15).
Appendix A4: The Proof of Renegotiation about the Succession Policy
Below I show that even if the existing board redetermines the succession policy after the incumbent CEO's tenure has been terminated, it still adopts the same succession policy as what has been determined together with the incumbent CEO in the …rst stage.
If the board were to redetermine the succession policy, it would take place between the third and fourth stages. At this stage, the wage to the incumbent CEO and d(p) are already determined, and they cannot change the contract even after the CEO has been dismissed.
Therefore, the board's expected utility will be expressed as:
if they decide to hire externally. On the other hand, if the board decides to recruit one of the internal candidates as the new CEO, its expected utility will become:
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The comparison of (A12) and (A13) yields the same result as Proposition 1.
Appendix A5: The Proof that the incumbent CEO and the board do not involve a potential new CEO in the negotiation even if they could
For clarity, I use the expression "two-player bargaining"for bargaining between the board and the incumbent CEO, and "three-player bargaining" for bargaining between the board, the incumbent CEO, and the potential CEO. I also assume that the potential CEO has bargaining power. That is, such CEOs are assumed to have some …rm/industry-speci…c knowledge that gives them the bargaining power. Such CEOs are limited in the market.
Below I show that the board and the incumbent CEO can negotiate with a potential CEO, which will cause them no leakage from the bargaining surplus: three-player bargaining. However, under three-player bargaining, the expected payo¤s to the board and the incumbent CEO may become smaller than the expected payo¤s that they could obtain from two-player bargaining, depending on the parameters. Moreover, the stronger the potential CEO's bargaining power and/or opportunity cost, the greater the potential CEO's share and hence the smaller the board's and the incumbent CEO's expected payo¤s. That is, the model in this paper may look like the board and the incumbent CEO are negotiating by themselves because that is the only choice that they have, but below I show that two-party negotiation is the result of omitting the potential CEO. That is, the board and the incumbent CEO …rst have the choice of whether to undertake three-player bargaining or two-player bargaining, but the present paper has focused on the case in which they do not involve the potential CEO (two-player bargaining), because doing so makes them better o¤.
Below I consider three-player bargaining. I must note that there is a case in which both the board's and the incumbent CEO's expected payo¤s are always larger under three-player bargaining than under two-player bargaining. However, this is con…ned to the unique case where the threat point of the board and the incumbent CEO under three-player bargaining equals the bargaining solution of the two-player bargaining. I con…rm that this scarcely occurs. To do so, I denote the threat point of the board and the incumbent CEO under the two-player bargaining game to be B and C , and that under three-player bargaining game to be B and C . Next, denote the payo¤s to the board, the incumbent CEO, and a potential CEO to be B; C; and N , respectively. Furthermore, denote the Pareto frontier for the threeplayer bargaining to be 1 , and that for the two-player bargaining to be 2 . Clearly, 1 > 2 holds. If I assume that B and C equal the bargaining solution of the two-player bargaining game, the following expressions must hold: B + C + N = 1 and B + C = 2 . The threat point of the potential CEO, N , can be anything as long as B + C + N is less than 1 .
In this situation, three-player bargaining always yields larger utilities for the board and the incumbent CEO. However, this rarely occurs.
The reason that the above relationships scarcely occur is that the potential CEO must be compensated for his opportunity cost if the negotiation breaks down. In other words, the potential CEO is not just a worker without skills/experience/reputation selected from a competitive market. Instead, he is a person with certain experience and some …rm/industryspeci…c knowledge. Such a person has his own job and may be o¤ered several positions elsewhere. If he decides to enter into negotiation for the CEO's position in a new …rm, which requires some e¤ort and time, this …rm must compensate him for his opportunity cost. Therefore, the correct scenario would be B + C + N = 1 and B + C = 2 "potential CEO's opportunity cost". Hence, three-player bargaining does not always improve the board and the incumbent CEO's expected payo¤s. Therefore, under three-player bargaining, the expected payo¤s to the board and the incumbent CEO may become smaller than the expected payo¤s that they could obtain from two-player bargaining.
Appendix A6. A Simple Model of Leakage
Basic Environment
In this section, I identify two forms of corporate governance systems: the externalrecruiting system and the internal-promotion system. In both systems, the board consists of one incumbent CEO and n incumbent directors. Under the external-recruiting system, if the incumbent CEO is …red, a new CEO is always externally hired, and the board members remain unchanged. Under the internal-promotion system, if the incumbent CEO is …red, one of the incumbent directors is promoted and becomes the new CEO, and to maintain the board size, a new director is hired. Therefore, under an external-recruiting system, the newcomer is the newly hired CEO, and under an internal-promotion system, the newcomer is the newly hired director.
Players: There are two players: the board of directors and the incumbent CEO. There are n incumbent directors on the board, but they are treated as one player. The CEO is either talented T or substandard S , determined by nature, with no one knowing the CEO's true talent. The distribution of the incumbent CEO's talent is the same as that of any other potential CEO, and it is 1=2 for being T (S ). Given that the incumbent CEO here is no di¤erent from the potential CEO, he does not have bargaining power to negotiate his own wage with the board of directors.
Information Gathering Strategy: When the board hires the specialist to monitor the CEO, the specialist provides the board with precise information about the CEO's true talent with probability one. Then, with probability q, the CEO is discovered to be of type T , and with probability (1 q), type S. When the board does not hire the specialist, the board's prior belief about the incumbent CEO's true talent remains unchanged. The incumbent CEO is replaced with a new CEO when he is discovered to be of type S, but otherwise he is retained. The payment to the specialist, that is, monitoring cost, is a constant c.
Payo s:
The board objective is to maximize its utility: the pro…t of the …rm, less the monitoring cost and the wage of the CEO, where the pro…t of the …rm is dependent on the talent of the CEO. For the sake of simplicity, the board pro…t equals the corporate pro…t.
The expected pro…t of the …rm is denoted as N when the incumbent CEO is retained without monitoring. This is also the same when the incumbent CEO is …red and a new CEO is hired. The expected corporate pro…t when the incumbent CEO is of type T is denoted G , and it is denoted as L when he is of type S. In short, G > N > L is assumed. The CEO's objective is to receive both the wage and the private bene…t, such as reputation or status. The CEO will receive the wage regardless of his situation, but the private bene…t is only given to the CEO who is serving at the last stage of the game. The reservation utility of the CEO is assumed to be r.
Timing: In the …rst stage, the board posts an o¤er that the incumbent CEO must either accept or reject. The board o¤ers (p; w), where p 2 f0; 1g : 0 meaning no monitoring by the specialist and 1 meaning there will be monitoring by the specialist. The specialist is hired by the board of directors at a …xed cost of c. w is the wage o¤ered to the CEO. To be more precise, the board o¤ers the incumbent CEO (p; w) = (1; w 1 ) or (p; w) = (0; w 0 ). In the case of p = 1, with probability q, the specialist gives the board precise information that the CEO is of type T . With probability (1 q), the board receives precise information about the CEO's talent to be of type S. In the second stage, the CEO accepts or rejects the o¤er.
The pro…t of the …rm is realized, and players receive their pro…ts.
A Simple Model
The players'expected utilities when the board o¤ers (p; w) = (0; w 0 ) In this case, there is no monitoring, and hence, the incumbent CEO serves to the end of the game without his talent being updated in either the external-recruiting system or the internal-promotion system. In other words, all the incumbent players are retained to the end of the second stage, and there will be no newcomer. Thus, the expected utilities of the players are the same in both systems; the board's expected utility is expressed as:
and the incumbent CEO's expected utility is expressed as:
The players'expected utilities when the board o¤ers (p; w) = (1; w 1 ) In this case, the board's utilities are di¤erent for the two systems. This is because under an externalrecruiting system, discovering that the incumbent CEO is substandard (S) is equivalent to saying that the incumbent CEO is …red and a new CEO is externally hired, whereas under an internal-promotion system, it is equivalent to saying that the incumbent CEO is …red and a new CEO is internally promoted. Therefore, the board's expected utility in the external-recruiting system is expressed as:
The …rst and second terms of (A16) represent the expected pro…t to the board. That is, the board …nds the CEO talented (T ) with probability q; and …nds him substandard (S) with probability (1 q); and …res him and hires a new CEO. The third term is the wage that the board pays to the incumbent CEO, which is o¤ered to him at the …rst stage. The last term is the cost of monitoring. 36 As for (A17), the CEO receives w On the other hand, the board's expected utility under an internal-promotion system is expressed as:
The CEO's expected utility (A19), is as (A17). The di¤erence between an external-recruiting system and an internal-promotion system appears in the second term of the board's utilities.
With probability (1 q), the board …nds the incumbent CEO substandard S, and hence, it replaces the incumbent CEO with a new CEO, who was originally one of the board members.
Recall that a new director is hired in this case to keep the board size at n: Thus, with probability (1 q); one of the original board members obtains b, and each of the remaining
The board' s optimal choice Given these expected utilities, the board makes the optimal choice in the …rst stage in o¤ering (0; w 0 ) or (1; w 1 ); provided that the CEO will accept the o¤er in the second stage.
External-recruiting system If the board posts (0; w 0 ), the wage is determined to satisfy 
Substituting w O 1 = r qb into (A16) yields:
Therefore, the board decides whether to hire the specialist to monitor the CEO by comparing (A20) and (A21). When b is su¢ ciently small, (A21) < (A20) holds, and as a result, the board posts (1; w O 1 ): When b is large, (A20) > (A21) holds, and as a result, the board posts (0; w 0 ). Recall that b is the private bene…t that is given only to the CEO serving at the last stage and will be regarded as leakage by the incumbent board if the incumbent CEO does not receive it. Thus, if the leakage of b is large, the board posts (0; w 0 ) in order not to replace the incumbent CEO.
Internal-promotion system The wage level is determined to satisfy b + w 0 = r when the board posts (0; w 0 ); while it is determined to satisfy qb + w I 1 = r when it posts (1; w I 1 ). Thus, the board makes the optimal choice between (0; w 0 ) = (0; r b) and (1; w I 1 ) = (1; r qb). Substituting w 0 = r b into (A14) yields:
Substituting w I 1 = r qb into (A18) yields:
The board's decision whether or not to post an o¤er to monitor is determined by comparing (A22) and (A23). When De…nition Leakage is de…ned as the expected pro…t that is lost from the incumbents'joint expected utility. This leakage occurs to the incumbents' pro…ts when the incumbent CEO is replaced, the replacement of which leads to a member change within the incumbent members.
This Appendix is used to show that the monitoring that is intended to …re the incumbent CEO induces a leakage to the incumbent members' joint expected utility, and because of this, whether to hire the specialist to monitor the CEO is not solely determined by a trade-o¤ between the positive e¤ect of increase in the expected pro…t, which is shown by G N , and the negative e¤ect of monitoring cost c: That is, if the marginal pro…t gained by monitoring the CEO exceeds the addition of the monitoring cost and the amount of leakage from the expected joint utility of the incumbents, the board has an incentive to hire the new CEO, and thus, it posts an o¤er of 'monitor.' In other words, if the amount of leakage is large, the board does not monitor for the sake of reducing the risk of having leakage. Note that the board has to consider which type of leakage (b or N n ) it will incur if it is given the option of choosing where to bring the next CEO from.
Appendix B
Anecdotal Evidence
In practice, when the board replaces the CEO if the …rm shows bad performance, the board must …nd a new CEO. In this process, most board members keep their seats after the CEO is replaced even though they should also be held responsible for the damage to …rm value.
For example, when Carleton Fiorina was forced by the board to resign as CEO and Lastly, another example of CEO replacement without a change in the composition of board members is the case of Yahoo! following Microsoft's failed takeover. The CEO was forced to leave the …rm after the proxy …ght in Yahoo!. While this is not exactly the same as the topic addressed in this paper, where the CEO is …red by the board, they are the same in the sense that the CEO hugely damages the …rm, but only the CEO is laid o¤, and the remaining board members are retained. Below is a relevant quote from Kim et al. (2010, pp. 117-118) . Note : Threat point, , is the outcome that will occur if there is a breakdown of cooperation; that is, the board will receive θ and the incumbent CEO will receive θ . When the bargaining frontier for internal promotion is far out than that of external recruitment, internal promotion succession policy is chosen, as illustrated in Panel A. When the bargaining frontier for external recruitment is far out than that of internal promotion, external recruitment succession policy is chosen, as illustrated in Panel B. 
